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Tax Effects on the Value of Incentive Stock 
Options (ISOs) and the Decision to Go Public
Thomas A. Rhee
The incentive stock options (ISOs) are similar to the regular stock call options. 
However, when one considers various taxing laws regarding the ISO stocks, the 
ISOs have unique features differentiated from the regular stock call options. In 
general, no income from ISOs is realized, for tax purposes, either upon the grant 
or exercise of the ISOs, until the ISO stock is actually sold. This poses an 
interesting question to executives with ISOs about when the firm should go public. 
In fact, a significant wealth can accrue to executives with the ISO stocks, when 
the firm’s stock becomes publicly traded. Therefore, any changes in the tax law 
may affect the financial value of ISOs and also the firm’s decision to go public.
The present paper examines the valuation process of the ISOs and investigates 
the economic effects of tax law changes on “going public.” The result suggests 
that the 1986 TRA may have delayed the firm’s decision to go public, while the 
U.S. Administration’s recent individual income tax hike to finance the govern­
ment deficit may somewhat encourage the firm’s activity to go public.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are several reasons why a firm may want to go public. The first and an 
obvious reason is that a firm can raise equity capital in the public market place. The 
firm being publicly traded, the existing shareholders now have an additional 
financial asset, which can be used as a means of payment and can be converted into 
cash. There are also other reasons why firms do go public. The search cost of finding 
a buyer of the firm’s equity interest is saved as a public company. On the other hand, 
the firm’s sudden ability to raise capital in the equity market as a public entity also 
helps increase the firm’s borrowing capacity in the debt market as well. However, 
one of the most important reasons for firms going public is to retain and attract 
qualified professionals who often demand additional incentive stock options as a 
form of the company’s deferred compensation.* Many professional managers
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realize the full value of the incentive stock options (ISOs) once the firm is publicly 
traded.
The value of ISOs is often affected by changes in the tax law. To the extent that 
a reduced (or increased) value of ISOs affects the wealth of executives and 
consequently, their work performances, changes in the tax law may have profound 
impacts even on the firm value. This is a serious problem to consider in a corporate 
environment, where the principal-agent relationship exists.
The present paper analyzes the effects of various tax law changes on the value 
of ISOs. Furthermore, the paper investigates how ISOs differ from regular call 
options, and discusses how changes in the value of ISOs can either delay or 
facilitate the firm’s decision to go public through the company’s initial public 
offerings.
II. PROBLEMS TO ANALYZE
Similar to the regular stock call option, the executive ISOs grant the holder the 
rights to own a prespecified quantity of company stocks at an agreed-upon (or 
strike) price, in principle, at any time upon the ISO’s issuance.^ Therefore, at least 
on surface, the ISO is no different from the regular calls in that both options will 
have value, only if the underlying stock price exceeds the option’s exercise price.
Certain tax rules, however, complicate the ISO’s valuation unlike in the case 
of the regular stock options.^ In general, no income from ISOs is realized, for tax 
purposes, either upon the grant or exercise of the ISOs, until the ISO stock is 
actually sold. This results in rather unusual circumstances for ISOs. For the 
particular tax law governing recognizing income from the ISO stock can make the 
valuation of ISOs rather unique.
III. SOME RECENT TAX LAW CHANGES
Prior to the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, the capital gains received preferential 
tax treatment, subject only to one half of the ordinary income tax rate. As a 
consequence, many executives realized income from the ISO stock in the form of 
capital gains. To qualify for the favorable tax treatment, however, the ISO stock was 
required to be held at least for two years from the date on which the option was first 
granted and at least for one year from the time of the exercise of the option.'*
One of the sweeping changes in the 1986 TRA directly affecting the employee 
deferred compensation is to raise tax revenues by abolishing the special tax 
treatment on capital gains, on the one hand, and on the other hand, by revamping 
the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).  ^ Specifically, the AMT rate rose. This 
affects the value of ISOs significantly.
Assuming that the ISO stock justifies exercise, it can be sold for immediate 
profits* or create tax preferences’ by postponing the sale of his shares. In either case,
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tax consequences facing executives differ, especially when the taxpayer will have 
to compute his taxes twice, once under the regular tax table and once under the AMT 
rule, whichever is greater. Obviously, from the taxpayer’s standpoint, whether to 
realize his profits immediately or to create tax preferences, or to do some of both, 
became more important now than ever before with the enactment of the 1986 TRA.
To illustrate the problem, the highest individual tax rate prior to the tax reform 
was 50 percent and long-term capital gains were taxed at the rate of 20 percent, 
thereby establishing a spread of 30 percent. Thus, unless the tax preference item 
was large enough, figuring tax under AMT did not raise the tax liabilities. Under 
the 1986 TRA, however, the spread narrowed to seven percent effective 1988: the 
highest individual marginal tax rates were reduced to 28 percent and the tentative 
minimum income is now taxed at 21 percent.® As a result, an active use of AMT is 
almost mandatory to the majority of executives with ISO stocks, warranting an 
optimal tax strategy.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Individual Income Taxes and the Valuation of ISOs
Imagine that a firm has already gone public through the initial public offerings of 
the firm’s securities. An executive with cash needs of X dollars in any particular 
year seeks a lower AMT rate on his tax return under the present tax system.’ Typical 
problems facing the executive is whether ISOs he holds should be exercised now 
or at a later date in the future. This would obviously depend on the executive’s 
additional cash needs for this and future periods. Had the ISO stock not been 
exercised, there is no tax consequences, of course. However, if exercised in taxing 
year, should they be sold for gain in the same year or at a later date? Whether or how 
much to exercise and/or to sell has to be an economic decision, relative to the 
executive’s inter-temporal consumption preferences. However, what is clear is that 
the value of ISOs is the executive’s ability, within the present tax laws, to raise 
additional income for this or any other future periods.
Let ( f  = the amount of ISOs held by executives; = the quantity of the 
exercised ISO stocks to be sold for an immediate gain; = the quantity of the 
exercised ISO stocks to create tax preferences; and q  ^= the amount of ISOs not 
exercised. Then, by using mnemonic symbols,
q'" = q, + q, + q„ (i)
Assume that the taxpayer has the current consumption requirement, Y^ , which 
exceeds his after-tax other regular income, i.e., > (1 -  t^I^, where = the ordinary 
individual tax rate and/^ = the present ordinary taxable income. Then, the taxpayer 
has to exercise his ISOs and sells stocks for immediate gain to meet his current
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consumption, In this circumstance his tax obligation is +1^}, where
5p represents the current stock price if the firm goes public today But by realizing 
income on the ISO stock, the taxpayer ends up .with a higher tax burden by the 
amount of If he creates tax preferences, his total taxable income, {qJ^ S^
-E )  + /g}, is subject to a lower AMT rate, t^ . If each taxpayer minimizes his tax 
liability, he will choose values for q^ , q^  and q  ^to meet his current consumption 
requirement, Y ,^ in taxing year. Whether he will indeed be able to do so is a function 
of how many shares of ISO stocks he has and of what kind of tax liabilities he would 
face as a consequence. In all circumstance, his current tax obligation, T^ , under the 
present IRS code, is
+ (2)
where the amount of tax preference is qt(S^ -  £).
No rational taxpayer will create tax preferences to pay higher taxes than what 
he could have paid had he not sought tax preference. Therefore, there must exist a 
unique value of q^  exercised for each q^  exercised and immediately sold. In fact, the 
unique relationship between q^  and q^  can be found in equation (2). Equating the two 
alternative taxes in equation (2) and solving for q^ ,
(3)
Substituting equation (3) into the regular tax computation in equation (2) gives the 
executive’s tax liabilities as
Noting that the executive’s before-tax realized income available for consump­
tion is [/g + qJiS^-E) -  qJE], the after-tax available income, Y^ , after exercise of his 
ISOs is
+ (5) 
= (1 -  ',)[9,(S„ -  mtj(h -  r,)}] -  qf (6)
The optimal values of q^ , q^  and q^  can be found by solving equations (1), (3) 
and (6) simultaneously. The results are
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C  = W l  -  'oXSo - E ) 9 - E ] -  y (S , -  E) (8)
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and
(9)
where 0 = tj{t^ - >  0." It is assumed that both q* and q*  are non-negative, i.e., 
?s* ^ hence, (S^—E)!E a 1/0(1 — t^. Obviously, if the executive had been 
granted sufficiently large amount of ISO stocks, the amount of after-tax income, Y ,^ 
after his ISO’s exercise could have equalled his optimal current consumption, C„, 
if the taxpayer wished.
The effect of tax law changes on the demand for q*, q* and q*  can be seen 
by differentiating equations (7) through (9) with respect to various tax parameters. 
TTie result is
bq*lbtg > 0; ?iq*/bt^ < 0 
^q*!btg > 0; hq*!bt^ < 0
b q ; ib t g  <  0; b q ; ib t ^  >  0 (10)
Since the 1986 TRA lowered while raising t^ , the above results would imply 
that the tax reform will effectively reduce q*  and q* but increase q*. That is, 
contrary to what the TRA may have intended, incentives to exercise ISO stocks, 
whether for immediate profit realization or to create tax preferences, declined. This 
means less tax yield to the government, at least not from high salaried executives. 
In fact, this also means that firms, run by professional managers with ISOs, will not 
go public any sooner to realize the gain from exercise of ISOs.
Note, however, that the preceding discussion will hold true for a given level 
of the executive’s current after-tax income, Yg. Clearly, any changes in tax laws will 
also affect the level of and hence, something is missing in our analysis.
B. Intertemporal Consumption Decision
To complete the discussion, let’s assume for simplicity that an individual is 
faced with an intertemporal decision only for today and tomorrow and that his after­
tax income endowment in each period is given by (1 -  tg)I^  and (1 -  tg)I^ , 
respectively. If tomorrow’s income can be exchanged for income today at the 
reciprocal of (one plus) the market rate of interest, r, the executive with the ISO 
stock has the intertemporal consumption opportunity boundary;
Co - (1 - ‘X =(1+'•r [(1 - - c,] (11)
The left hand side (LHS) of equation (11) is the amount of extra money which 
must be raised to satisfy the individual’s current consumption. If LHS is borrowed, 
he will pay interests and thus, including the principal, he must pay [(1 -  -  CJ 
dollars in the future periods. As an alternative, the executive can exercise his ISO 
stocks to finance all or at least a part of LHS. Therefore, a rule to determine an 
optimal Yp is as follows.
First, in a two -period model,
= ( l - a / ,  + (« ,*+ « /X 5 .-£ )] (12)
since
T, = t,{(q; + q ;)(S ^ -E ) + I^} (13)
Next, note that the total interest costs on the borrowing of (C„ -  7 )^ dollars after 
exercise of ISO stocks is (1 + r)(C^ -  Y^) dollars. Given the values of 7j, as in 
equation (12), and Cj, however,
( c , - y , x i  + r ) = ( y , - c . )  (14)
Thus, if the RHS of equation (14) is greater than the LHS, the implicit cost of 
funds, T , will be lower than the market rate of interest, r, and hence, exercise the 
ISOs as much as optimally possible, i.e., use the rule as outlined in equations (7) 
through (9) except that 7^  will be replaced with C .^ Otherwise, borrow money in the 
capital market to finance his current consumption demands. Thus, given the 
definition of in equation (12), the higher the 5j, i.e., the higher the stock price in 
the future, the greater the vdue of Y^  will be for any given q* and q*.
Figure 1 shows how the value of ISOs is derived in the most simplistic settings 
of a two-period model. The over-time endowed income in the absence of ISOs is 
denoted by the coordinate, I. Given the capital market line, the executive maximizes 
his intertemporal utility fimction at C°, where his indifference curve is tangent 
to the budget line For a consumption combination at C^ , however, the 
executive must borrow an amount equal to I^C ,^ on which he pays/jCj in the next 
period. With the exercise of a part of his ISO stocks, however, he can increase his 
current income by YJ^, and hence, all he has to do is borrow C^Y  ^in this period. 
Again, given the market interest rate of r, which is represented by the budget line
1 ’ pays Y  'Cj in the next period. However, with the unexercised and/or unsold
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Figure 1: Intertemporal Consumption Decision
ISO stocks, the executive has an additional income equal to Y^Y’ in the next period. 
The present value of this additional income is the segment With this additional 
wealth accruing to the executive, his new consumption pair is now at C*, where his 
utility is higher. Symbolically, PV(Y^  -Y ') = PV(y;) -  PV (Y') = PV(Y;) -A^ +
= PV(Y,) -  [/„ + FV(A)1 = py(y , -  + ( n  -  ^ o)- Using equations (4), (5) and
(12), the value, V, of ISOs can be derived as follows:
v = p m - t o M *  + qn*)(So-E)] 
+ [ q ; ( S ,- E ) - q ; E - T ^ ] (15)
It says that the value of the ISO stocks accrues to executives in two ways. First, 
the amount of and q^  not only minimizes the current tax liabilities but also 
provides additional income in this period without having to go into the debt market. 
(See the expression in the second bracket). Second, the amount of the ISO stocks
unexercised and/or exercised but not yet sold in this period may also enhance the 
future income streams. And this has to be discounted to compute the present value 
of such opportunity. (See the expression in the first bracket).
V. THE COST OF THE ISO STOCKS
To analyze the effect of ISOs on going public, the above discussions to value ISOs 
will have to be generalized to a much more realistic multi-period case. Furthermore, 
since going public is not costless, the cost associated with corporations gaining a 
public status will also have to be made explicit.
Let’s assume that when ISOs were granted earlier as a tax-free deferred 
compensation, their fair market values were E dollars. If the stock value is expected 
to decline, the ISOs would not have any value and hence, the taxpayer would have 
exploited the full current value of the options. However, if the stock price is 
expected to rise, the dollar value of ISOs were not being exercised can be 
considered a form of investment. For this is an additional income which could have 
been realized but has been foregone. Clearly, this type of investment costs q*{S^ 
-  £) dollars. The value of the investment does not only include the regular option 
values'^ but also, perhaps more importantly, the value of tax preferences the 
executive can create in the future. As it were, there is in general a positive value of 
“waiting” to exercise later.
On the other hand, although the ISO stocks exercised to commence tax 
preferences now will not have this type of “waiting” value, the executive would 
have ended up holding regular stock investments in the company at the cost of E 
dollars less tax savings from the option’s exercise. This type of stock investment 
can be valued in terms of the value of other regular options by using the put-call 
parity relation.*"* That is, commencing tax preferences through the exercise of ISOs 
is equivalent to buying a call, writing a put and lending at the risk-free rate of 
interest. Since the cost of investment is q*E, the net present value of this type of 
investment equals the present value of the future dividends less E dollars, i.e.,
In the meantime, the cost of going public can be seen in terms of the negative 
signals that the executive sends to the investor when the ISO stocks are exercised 
and sold.’^  When information asymmetry exists between company insiders and the 
outside investor, the sale of stocks can signal negative prospects for the company. 
Thus, it is argued that the cost of going public is a possible decline in stock prices 
as the amount of the sale of ISO stocks increases. This cost will be represented as 
the symbol, C^ , below.
VI. OPTIMAL TIMING TO GO PUBLIC
Since both benefits and costs generated by exercise of ISOs are spread over time, 
the profitability of going public is measured by its net present value, NPV„.
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Assuming that the stock price at the time of the ISO’s exercise is S ,^ and that the 
stock price grows at some constant rate, g, the stock price, 5^, at some future point 
in time, ji, is 5^=5, where 5, = S^e^\ Assuming also that the negative signalling 
cost of the sale of ISO stocks is C^ , the NPV“ of ISOs will be given by:
NPV.=J” +
-[9 ,* (S ,-£ ) + 9 ,* £ + C Jc - (16)
C’
The first two terms in equation (16) are the multi-period version of the present value 
of ISOs as shown in equation (15). The last term in equation (16) is the opportunity 
cost of ISOs described at the beginning of the present section of this paper. For r 
> g, equation (16) can then be evaluated as
rs -^<r-g)‘
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-E t+  ConstantNPV„ = ( 1 - 0 ( ^ „ - 0
L r - g
- [ (q „ * -q ; ) (S -E )  + T, + Y;ie-^ (17)
The value of t, t*, which maximizes the NPV^ , of the ISOs, can be found by 
differentiating equation (17) with respect to t and setting it equal to zero. The result 
is
+E] = o /e -^  (18)
where
«. = ( ! -  '.)(4o -  <!•) “ d = [(4 / -  CXS, - « )  + T, + CJ
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal timing problem for going public as the 
executive seeks to maximize the NPV  ^of his ISO stock holdings under the present 
tax law. The LHS of equation (18) is represented by W  curve reflecting the 
“marginal” present value of the ISO’s future benefits with respect to time t. On the 
other hand, the RHS of equation (18) represents the “marginal” cost of the ISO’s 
exercise with respect to time t, and is depicted by CC curve. W  curve falls much 
more slowly than CC curve with respect to time, t. Assuming that the value of 
is positive, an interior solution exists at the point e.
Since changes in and will shift W  and CC curves, the comparative static 
results will depend on the partial derivatives of equation (18) as follows:
6LHS _ -(r-g)t* riScJi, 8RHS _ -rcboz
------  = + xS I--- 1 -------= rC ----
8LHS_§RHS________________  -r/*8cj2
' bt bt bt
“ a a a
Clearly, the partial derivatives of Oj and will depend upon the partials of 
q*  and with respect to the tax rates, and L. That is,
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8 0 i
- (-1 )
8 '.J
(19.1)
d02
—  (S -£ )
8<o 8 rJ
<0 (19.2)
(19.3)
8 O7
— " —  ( S - E ) —  + 
bt  ^ ^ . bt bt bt
(19,4)
Therefore, the results in equations (19) suggest that if t^  falls and t^  rises, both W  
and CC curves shift upward. It seems, however, that upon careful investigation of 
the above equations (19), CC curve will rise more than W  curve. This means that 
an optimal timing of the ISO’s exercise should occur much later than the original 
equilibrium at f*.
That is, exercising the ISO stock by the firm’s going public has both its benefits 
and costs. Assuming that the company’s stock value is expected to continue to rise, 
the model presented seems to suggest that if decreases and increases, an increase 
in the cost of the ISO’s exercise outweighs an increase in the ISO’s benefits. In the 
end, the majority of firms may wish to remain private. On the other hand, if our 
analysis were correct, the recent Bush Administration’s measure to raise the 
ordinary income tax rates to finance the government deficits may shorten the 
optimal timing for firms to go public.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The ISOs are similar to the regular stock call options. However, when one considers 
various taxing laws regarding the ISO stocks, the ISOs have unique features which 
can be differentiated from the regular stock call options.
In particular, a significant wealth can accrue to executives with the ISO stocks. 
And the wealth can be realized when the firm goes public and when the company’s 
stock becomes publicly traded. Therefore, any changes in the tax law which may 
affect the financial value of ISOs can either delay or hasten the firm’s decision to 
go public.
The present paper examined the valuation process of the ISOs and investigated 
the economic effects of tax law changes on “going public.” The result suggests that
in fact, the 1986 TRA may have delayed the firm’s decision to go public, while the 
U.S. Administration’s recent individual income tax hike to finance the government 
deficit may encourage the firm’s activity to go public. In essence, the 1986 tax law 
change may have ended up penalizing executives with ISOs, thereby reducing the 
incentives to go public. If going public is a vehicle to realize the employee deferred 
compensation for executives and if such a vehicle becomes expensive, the structure 
of executive compensation contracts may also change.
Acknowledgment: An earlier version of this paper was first presented at the Second Annual 
Small Firm Financial Research Symposium, California State University, Fresno, California, 
April 26-27,1990.
NOTES
1. It is well known that the incentive conflict almost always exists between the stockholders,
i.e., the principal and managers, i.e., agents. This conflict is at least partially controlled 
by incentive provisions of executive compensation contracts which formally tie the 
manager’s compensation to some measure of firm performance. The frequently stated 
objective of these widely used provisions is to encourage managers to maximize the value 
of the firm. For a general overview of these incentive provisions which are typically found 
in the employee compensation contracts, see Smith and Watts (1983).
2. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Section 422A(b) spells out various requirements for the 
company’s ISO plan.
3. Miller and Scholes (1982) first presented the model of the ISOs in the context of various 
taxes.
4. Lavelle and Welsh (1988) argue, however, that although the 1986 TRA does seem to have 
diminished the attractiveness of ISOs by abolishing the special tax treatment on capital 
gains, such preferential tax treatment is not necessary to fully utilize the ISO provisions 
to reap low-taxed benefits.
5. Ibid.
6. Since there is not special tax treatment on capital gains, delaying the profits till a later date 
is of no relevance.
7. The Internal Revenue Code imposes a one-year holding period requirement for ISOs to 
be qualified for the status of tax preferences under the AMT rule.
8. The Bush Administration has recently taken measures to raise the effective individual 
income tax rates to finance the government deficit. This may negate the effect of the 1986 
TRA somewhat.
9. It is assumed that a two-year statutory time limitation for ISO exercise is now up and the 
current stock price exceeds the striking price.
10. It shall be assumed that > E.
11. Consider the following numerical example. Let’s assume that an executive earned in 1989 
$100,000 before tax and yet has after-tax cash liquidity requirement of $110,000. He has 
10,000 shares of ISOs which were valued at $5 at the time of grant. Two years have passed 
since then. Today the stock price is $20 a share. Under the IRS tax code, his marginal
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individual rate is 28 percent. The AMT rate is 21 percent after the 1986 TRA. In this case, 
substituting the appropriate values for 5„, E, Y^ , /„ and tax rates for t^  and t^ , we find that 
q* = 5,377 shares, q* = 4,015 shares and q*= 608 shares. That is, when 5^377 shares of 
ISO stocks were exercised and sold, his total income realized, including his other income 
of $100,000, is $180,655. But he also created the tax preference of $20,075, when he 
exercised additional 4,015 shares. After deducting his tax obligation of $50,589 under the 
AMT rule, the executive ends up having a disposal income of $110,000, as was to be 
proved.
12. Clearly, the exercise price of the option is E dollars.
13. The value of “waiting” will be henceforth referred to as the symbol, W.
14. See, for example. Black and Scholes (1973).
15. Myers and Majluf (1984) recently argued that the value of the firm may fall when new 
equity issues are announced. Earlier, Leland and Pyle (1977) also argued that the value 
of the firm is a negative function of the amount of equity held by the owner-managers of 
the firm.
16. The result in equation (10) holds constant. If the stock price is expected to rise 
sufficiently in the future, the taxpayer would use ISO stocks to meet his current 
consumption requirements in lieu of personal borrowing. Thus, 7^  in equations (7) through
(9) will be replaced with Y^ . Thus, the partial derivatives of q* and q* with respect to t^  
and t^  will be the same as in equation (10).
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